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INTRODUCTION.
A, Statement of the problem.
The subject of this thesis is the ethical theory of William
E, Hocking, Alford professor of philosophy at Harvard University,
He has written no text book on ethics and no book primarily devoted
to ethical theory, except as his Human Nature and its Remaking
approached that. Therefore the thesis material has been gathered
from all of his writings as each was read in the search for his
beliefs concerning moral value.
1. Its limits.
The thesis has been limited to a discussion of ethical or »oral
theory, and htnce only that which directly pertains to a theory of
value, or a study of the ideals which ought to be achieved in human
life, or that which is necessary to the understanding of such theory
is legitimate subject matter, Hocking's philosophy is both broad
and deep. He has dealt with psychology, with political theory, with
the philosophy of law, and with religion. There are many phases of
interest to the re.-der in all these discussions, but we have at-
tempted to avoid any detailed account of his views where those
views are not relevant to the subject of the thesis. We have also
tried to include all of the material which is necessary to its
clear understanding. Therefore we have included much that is pure-
ly descriptive because it forms a basis for that which is norma-
tive. Furthermore, hav ing found the theory it self J we have sought
for and recorded in so far as we were able, its applications in
the realms of the individual, society and the state. We have gath-
ered here," then, what we have understood of Hocking 1 s conception
of value: the intrinsic values and the instrumental values; the

supreme value and the relationship of others to it; the possibili-
ties of and helps toward the achievement of these values; and the
functions of individuals, society, the state, art, and religion
in promoting these things that are worth while in life,
2, Its significance.
Any attempt to find the true values of life and hence estab-
lish a standard by which to discern good from evil in all the
complexities of living is significant. At least any such attempt
which is based on a careful, critical investigation of facts is
significant, for to the extent that man finds truth and 1 earns
the ultimate goal of existence, to that extent can he eliminate
waste effort, and work toward that which will ultimately count
in the progress of the world.
But Hocking* s contribution to ethical theory has other signi-
ficance, First we might mention the wide range of his interest
and study. The man whose investigations are almost exclusively
in the realm of psychology, or biology, or sociology, or political
theory, or religion, is likely to be biased by his own interest
and assert a scheme of values which fits his own field, but will
not fit all others. Hocking, however, covers all of these fields i"
and though his results suffer inevitably in lack of thoroughness,
nevertheless he has achieved something of the synoptic view which
is the philosopher^ ideal. His ethical theory is the more signi-
ficant because he ha- tried to see life a^- a whole and relate
its various parts to a single, all-inclusive end.
Secondly, Hocking , s theory is significant because of its
idealism. In this age of emphasis on the practical and the mechan-
ical, of doubt of the functions of mind and the will, the exis-
tence of the soul, and of God, the idealist seems to stand out
«I
?
f
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as one "crying in the wilderness, H Hocking has recognized the
faults often found in other idealistic writings and has tried to
correct thenv To a considerable extent he has succeeded in combin-
ing an impartiality in the analysis of facts with an idealism
which must go beyond the facts into the realm of value- judgment^
,
B, Materials a«d Methods*
There are two chief sources of the material in this thesis:
first, the writings of Hoeking himself; and second, the reviews
and criticisms of his work. Of Hocking* s own books the one which
most nearly presents a whole view of his ethical theory is his
Human Nature and its Remaking .' but the others, with the possible
exception of Morale and itw Enemies which is in a different class,
having been written chiefly for the World War period;' are also
necessary and valuable to a full understanding of his beliefs
along this line, 1 Of his magazine articles, a few are simply ex-
tracts or preliminary statements of the material in his books;
some €o not attempt to go very thoroughly into their subject and
hence are worth while to us only as confirmation of his views
expressed elsewhere, A few such as "The Necessary and Sufficient
2
Conditions of Human Happiness'* are of real value to the study
of his ethical theory.
Most of the reviews are so brief that they are of little
value except as they help one see the general theme of a book
at a glance. The most helpful have been those that disagreed
strongly with the author, especially, Sabine, Maclver, Laguna,
3
and Macintosh,
Throughout the thesis our purpose has b^en to outline the
various parts of Hocking's theory as fairly and impartially as
possible. We have also tried to follow his general sequence of
!<
*
thought, although in combining material from the various books
it was sometimes necessary to make a break* One who wished to make
a careful study of all the applications of his theory of value to
various problems of life would find material which we have omitted
4
or only hastily scanned, but we have dealt only with the theory
and its major applications. In general, our plan has been to
outline first those facts of human nature, chiefly psychological,
which Hocking finds fundamental, and on which he builds his theory
of value. Then we have taken up his theory itself and finally the
relations of society and the state, art and religion to each
other, and to the values which he has suggested. What criticisms
have been inserted have been related to the subject matter in hand,
and not to Hocking's style or his general philosophical position,
for we are not attempting to review his books.
Ii
I, Human Nature: some facts "basic to a theory of ethics.
In studying the ethical theory of any man, it is necessary to
understand his fundamental psychological beliefs about human nature,
for a conception of what ought to be is usually based in some way
on a conception of what is. Hocking in his book Human Nature and
its Remaking spends a great deal of time describing human nature
as he sees it before dealing much with the normative question of
its remaking in the light of certain standards or ideals. The
method is well chosen. We shall follow the same plan,
A, Instincts,
It is difficult to distinguish original human nature from that
nature which we know, modified as it is by environment. The exis-
tence of instincts, however, is generally attributed to man's
heredity. The biologist sees in instincts a group of feflexes
called forth by stimuli, and responding in regular order until
certain conclusions are reached, A mechanism and its mode of oper-
ation are involved in each instinct, but this mechanism is subject,
especially in human beings, to modification by experience. The mod-
ified instincts tend to the formation of habits. The psychologist
notes that instincts increase the interest attached to objects of
perception, and they proppt conduct accordingly, "giving zest,
5
momentum, and assurance to that course of conduct,"
1, Range: difficulty of determining.
But given the fact of the existence of instincts in original
human nature, it is very difficult to determine just what instincts
do exist, and how much they actually influence human nature. The
arroiivcw ?xiiJbost
t -oiai 99
(
6variety or lists or instincts offered by m%n who study these
fields reveals the need of more accurate criteria ror defining
instincts. Hocking attributes the difficulty of determining the
range of instinct to these three facts:
1, "The balance of instincts," They often offset each other to
such an extent that they are inconspicuous or at least they can
not be distinguished one from the other, 6
2, "Variety of pattern," Each instinct does not have it? own
unique mode of expression. Several may find expression through
the same physiological preoesses or may use different physical
responses at diirerent times, 6
3, "Coalescence of instincts," The satisraction of one instinct
often brings with it the satisfaction of other related instincts
Recognising these difficulties, Hocking outlines his own
7
survey of instincts, dividing then into positive and negative
types, and denoting the degree of generality, the units of be-
havior and other characteristics. The list need not concern us
here except as we move on to his conception of central instincts
2, Central instincts: necessary interests.
Curiosity is placed among the instincts, yet it, unlike the
others, has no one class of objects which serve as its stimuli,
neither does it have any definite type of response. The state
of consciousness determines at any one moment what will arouse
curiosity and what will satisfy it. There seem to be other ten-
dencies which, like curiosity, are "central instincts", that is,
they are not confined to specific stimulus-response mechanisms.
They are "necessary interests" in that they do not depend on
"specific routings of nervous energy, but on the nature of the
I
nervous system itself
,
n Therefore they presumably serve needs
which are common to all animals with nervous systems.
Besides curiosity, Hocking recognizes various necessary in-
terests among the instincts which have frequently been rejected
as such because of their difference from the definite stimulus-
response type of instinct. For example, rhythm, self-preservation
or the will-to-live, the will to power, and sociability seem tfl
be necessary interests, "They are consequences of the fact that
the stuff of which we are made works better in one way than in
another.*' 9
He is very vague in this discussion finding as much difficulty
in defining which instincts are central as in determining what
are instincts at all. He has been criticised by some reviewer^
for this, 10 but he does offer an explanation. The general obscur-
ity and vagueness in regard to the central instincts is due, he
believes, to the fact that they cannot be separated from each
other as distinct interests, but are interwoven into one fundamen-
tal instinct. It is necessary to determine what this inclusive
central instinct is,
B, The will,
1, Definition,
Hocking defines the will as a ruling policy, a general princ-fp"
which governs a life, controlling even instinctive impulses, H'S
view is clear when he shows the relation of the will to the CAntr""*
instincts, and thus defines it more fully,
a. Relation to the central instincts.
It has already been proposed that the central instincts are

not distinct entities but are phases of one inclusive instinct.
The interlocking of these necessary interests is clearly seen
when one tries to attribute correct motives to men's acts. Mo-
tives are mixed. Hocking maintains that they are never entirely
separate even in their origin, for each successive experience
or act has its relation to and grows out of the self which em-
bodies all previous experiences. Experience slowly builds up in
the self a principle of choice, a ruling policy based on those
things which are satisfying to itself, "And to have a stable
policy is to have, in the specific sense of the word, a will." 1
Thus the will is the result of a development, A long series of
choices lies back of the conscious formulation of any principle.
The principle itself becomes more and more definitely outlined
as time goes on.
nWill exists when, and in so fa* as, any instinctive impulse
has first to obtain the consent of a ruling policy before
pursuing its course. The policy of a self is its acquired
Interpretation of its own central and necessary interest "
b. A fundamental human will.
If we assume that there is a human nature, that is, that
men afe fundamentally alike, there should be, Hoeking feels;
some primary ruling policy, or will, which is common to all men.
This most central of the central instincts has never been, and
probably never will be adequately expressed in any brief term.
Yet, realizing this limitation, Hocking uses the phrase "will
to power" to designate this fundamental "substance of the human
will." x This idea of the will to power is so important to
the whole ethical theory which we are studying that we must go
more deeply into Hocking's conception of it.

92, The will to power.
Many or the simple instincts obviously involve a striving
for power. Food-getting to a certain extent is a rorm or con-
quest, caused a reeling or mastery as well as or increased
strength and selr-control. Play provides practice in power, ski^
control. Pear expresses negatively the will to power. The sex
instinct, acquisitive instincts and others may be partly inter-
preted, at least, as a phase or this all-pervasive will to power.
Hocking rejects the term will to live, though in some respects
it is less likely to be misunderstood, because mere existence
is not a strong enough appeal, Rathep, one needs to say "the
will to live as a man," 14 which involves active and creative
qualities, or even better, use the term "will to power".
a. Relation to Nietzsche* s "will to power."
Hocking admittedly uses here the phrase so characteristic
of Nietzsche, and he hastens to cltar his own conception of it
from the mistakes or Nietzsche's view. Nietzsche's error, he
claims, consisted in the supposition that the term was adequate,
and also in the belief that power was competitive J something
to be achieved at the expense of others. Hocking, on the con-
trary, calls attention to the fact that he has admitted the in-
adequacy of the term for expressing all that the central instinct
really is. He hag used it merely for lack of a better term, and
because this particular form is most appropriate to the modern
stage of civilization. Furthermore, he rejects the competitive
implication, and insists that power-over must, in its highest
form, become power-for. The will to power does not exclude a
genuine love and service for mankind.
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This brief discussion of the difference between the two theor-
ies of the will to power is quite unsatisfactory because too short.
In the first place it may be doubted whether Nietzsche himself
regarded the term as entirely adequate. At least he clearly rec-g-
nized and «mqhasized the hypothetical character of the theory.
And secondly, Nietzsche did recognize "power-for" as well as
"power-over". That is, the truly strong man has power and to
spare. He can afford to give to others and work for their bene-
fit, where«s the selfish man is one who has energy enough only
for his own purposes. However, it is true that Hocking elim-fn-
ates as much as possible the competitive nature of the will to
power. His end is not the production of a few supermen at consid-
erable expense to the rest of mankind, but the opportunity for
all men to develop those powers that have been given them wilt
no injustice to others, as we shall see later. In this respect
he does satisfy his claim of advance over Nietzsche's view,
b. Definition and Function,
Perhaps the best definition of the will to power, as con-
ceived by Hoeking, is found in Man and the State ; "The will to
live, in man, takes the form of the will to power, i.e., the will
to be in conscious knowing control of such energies as the universe
18has, and to work with them in reshaping that universe." The
typical development of this will to power transforms it from
early self-assertive expression through various stages to the
final form of power through ideas. This becomes power for the
benefit or others because ideas are in the realm where they
IS
must be shared. But what is the function of this will to power?
If it is the central instinct of all human life how does it
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guide life to the attainment of its values?
The will to power is the chief agency in the "remaking" of
human nature, that is, the process of transforming all the spe-
cific instincts into a unified purpose. The peculiar charac-
teristic of man is his development of character, his self-chang-
ing and self-organ! ting, his remaking process^ And only a wil T
can truly transform a will. But it is not the only agency,
c. Cooperation with outer factors in experience.
The will must have something with which to work. It tfinds it^
material in external situations and, cooperating with them, forms
experience, which Hocking defines as just this working together
of inner and outer agents of change. He distinguishes two types
of experience: that which is called training because it involves
deliberate suggestion; and that which is not training, which
comes freely and naturally to the individual, either when alone
or in society. Hocking concerns himself here with the latter type.
The will to power finds its task in transforming the instincts
so that they meet and fit particular circumstances. In the human
being the instincts are even more general than in the lower ani-
mals. They have a wider range of response. This makes it possiv e
for the will to power to subordinate them to its own control and
thus guide their responses toward the promotion of its ends, Th5 ff
organisation in relation to the central instinct tends toward
the fixing of habits, which are the best found methods of response,
d. Determination of the "mental-after-image,"
Experience, that is, the cooperation of the will with exter-
nal situations has two chief tools by which it molds the indivi-
dual; pleasure and pain. The effect of each of these depends in

part on the mind which records them. Pain, for example, teaches
human beings to discriminate, to thinfc. There are pleasures and
pains which are definite sensations. These need merely to be
noted and either sought Or avoided in the future according to
their nature. There are others which cause a general feeling of
depression or elation. The mind studies the causes and effects of
these and learns to control behavior accordingly. But often in
more complex experiences, condunt must be guided by the "mental
-
after-image," One's own mental reaction (distinguished from Na-
ture's physical reaction) to a situation or an activity is the
final judge of its worth. This mental-after-image may be entirely
at variance with the physical pleasure or pain involved in the
experience. It is the will to power, the whole will, which deter-
mines this after-image when it sees the results of the action of
the partial impulse in the light of its total purpose, 20
e. The dialectic of the will.
The effectiveness of the will to power in thus controlling
instincts is illustrated by Hocking in a sketch of the changes
which pugnacity undergoes. This work of experience he calls the
dialectic of the will. In its original form pugnacity aims for
the destruction of its opponent. But the total will comes to
desire the evidence of its victim's suffering, and a recognition
of defeat. Therefore the instinct is transformed to revenge, abd
this takes place apart from any social restraint or suggestion.
But even revenge does not satisfy, for, especially where there
are many individuals, the permanent maintenance of hatred is
difficult and harmful. The third stage in the interpretation of
pugnacity is thus reached: punishment. Punishment causes pain but
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only temporarily, and it distinguishes between an evil element
of will and the whole will. When once this distinction has been
made, it is a comparatively short step, Hocking believes, to th«
fourth aim of pugnacity. Effort will be directed not so much
toward the destruction or punishment of the evil element, as
toward the restoration of the good of the whole, "The result is
a "complete suppression of the destructive behavior in the inter-
21
est of a resolute kindliness,"
Hocking's claim throughout this discussion is that experience
would be likely to product these transformations apart from "train
ing" , the deliberate correction of society,' or even of religion^
because the will increasingly learns what best satisfies it as a
whole. He does not deny, however, the influence and great help of
all phases of society in this process. His contention is that the
will is a very real factor in itself. It is not a product of
custom and social training, entirely. It is a factor in the mold-
ing of these. Human nature has an original direction which society
can modify but cannot distort.
This dialect of the will is essential not only to Hocking*
s
theory of the will but also to his ethical theory far many of the
values of human character depend on such a transformation of in-
stincts. He has placed conduct not on a basis of physiological
mechanisms but on a basis of moral choice by a will which has
unified all the impulses of life under a ruling principle, Thi-
principle is that which has been found by its experience to the
the best. It is the only basis for rational cfeoice.

3. "Will-circuits.
14
There is another phase of Hocking* s theory of the will which
should be discussed, especially because of its relation to his
view of the state. He speaks of "vital circuits" or, chiefly,
"will-circuits," What is his meaning in the use of these terms?
a. Definition,
No human being is sufficient unto itself. Its various in-
stincts reach out and involve other objects, as, for example, the
food-getting instinct needs its physical objects, its territory
for action, etc, The?e external objects become extensions of the
self and will, parts of the greater self, in some such way as
a limb is part of the body. The limb is held by vital circuit^
of nutrition. The external objects are held to the self by vital
22
circuits of the will, or by "will-circuits," The will-circuit
then is an extension of the self formed as its will and its habits
include within their activity objects external to the self,
b. Relation to the State,
There may be a will-circuit of a group as well as of an in-
dividual. Objects which are shared by the group, including the
human relationships of the members themselves," form a common wi T ^.
circuit. This grows more and more important as the group grows
larger ror the identity or interests increases. The will-circn^t
takes on the appearance of a distinct entity and the individual
feels more and more his obligation to contribute his share to the
group life. Hocking believes that the will-circuit of the group
is so strong that it demands the State as its organ. We examing
this interesting thmtvy more closely, finding out first why he
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rejects other forces as the reason for the State's existence.
(1) Sociability and economic forces insufficient.
Sociability certainly underlies th e State as it does other
social groups but in itself it is not strong enough to form the
State, Simple sociability draws people together; increases the
normal flow of ideas and thus raises the level of values in the
group. Yet sociability can also be divisive. That is, there are
distinct tendencies toward the small group which are divisive in
relation to the large group. Sociability is thus a variable force.
After all, in itself, it can create only the crowd. It must be
combined with other forces to do more than just bring people to-
gether, "It is headless: it can neither be nor outline a social
unity," 23
The prominence of economic forces in recent years has brought
forth the question whether they are not sufficient as the cause
of the state's existence. Hocking of course admits their power
but points out their essential tendency toward division rather
than unity. In its direct form, for example in hunger, economic
interest is self-assertive and hence divisive. In a more advanced
form it is cooperative as there develops division of labor and
the consequent formation of groups. But this cooperative aspect
is simply the basis for rivalry on a larger scale. Economic in-
terest, in itself, rorm« competitive groups^" not the necessary
unity or the state.
If neither sociability nor economic force is sufficient alone 1,'
the two combined might be adequate for the formation of the state.
But no, the divisive forces are still stronger than the unifying
forces. As society develops, desires are increased and self-assart-
ive tendencies become stronger. At the same time standards are

more vague, and are likely to be lower in the large group, so that
£hey rail to check sufficiently the self-assertion which brings
division and competition.
Spec \fic
The state is not based primarily on Ainstincts at all. There is
certainly no state-building instinct, and combinations of other
instincts are not peculiar to the state or are so subject to mod-
ification by environment that they lack the stability necessary
for the organisation of a political unity. Hocking turns to the
will for the psychological basis of the state,
(2) The state as will-circuit.
We have already discussed Hocking's understanding of the #111,
This ruling policy in the individual is interested in more than
itself. It has an interest in and assumes some responsibility f~r
the group of which it is a member. Notice, Hocking says, a gang
of boys. Each feels himself competent to rule its affairs, ThiS
"overflow" of the will tends toward the state, "The will to power
in the form of the disposition to administer is the psychological
OA
origin of the state,"
This assertion is based on the theory of will-circuits. As
vital circuits tend to be established by the major instincts, =•©
the will to power, the fundamental instinct of man, nust have its
circuit, its physical objects, its region of activity, its sources
of supply, "The state is the circuit required by the will to
power or each member, coincident for til the people of a defined
territory, and including them," 25 The state is the most inclu-
sive of all the groups within society. Hence the wills to power
find their" total circutt in it.
If the will-circuit is the psychological basis for the st^te
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it is evident why nations are formed rather than a universal
state. A circuit is limited in its possible range* It develops
within certain geographic areas, has a comparatively limited
time-scan and revolves around activities which cumulate as hist-
ory unique unto itself. The wilj^oircuit also explains why the
state is not optional. One cannot become a member or drop one's
membership at will, at least not in the State in general, though
one might in any particular state. More of this under a later
section (III, B). Furthermore the genuine unity in the wills of
citisens is explained without recourse to any "mystical corporate
personality." 26 or other binding force. The unity is more than
a mere idea or principle, it is an actual coincidence of the
wills to power, as each reaches out into regions common to others
It is a unity which placss the responsibility of group action on
every member. Hocking rejects the conception of a "group mind"
for the following reasons: first, the inability to attach re -
sponsibility to anything or anyone but the members themselves;
second, the ease with which groups are formed and broken; and
third, the instability of groups under changing leadership. 27
There is no separate entity to which value attaches apart from
the members themselves.
Such is the theory. Its implications are seen under the
section devoted to the state. Criticism is reserved until them*

18
C, Conscience,
So rar
;
Hocking, in his study of human nature^ has found it
composed of instincts, both specific and central. These are all
org&nieed around and subordinated to the will or the will to
power, the fundamental instinct of mankind. The social expression
of this will to power is in will-circuits, of which the state is
the most complete representative. But in the political life which
thus originates, man's chief interest seems to be in justice, in
establishing principles of right and wrong which are embodied in
its l«ws. Is this too a part of original human nature? Is there
a native moral instinct, a conscience?
1 # Obligation as socially developed.
Social obligation, "you-ought" , does not need a native in-
stinct as a foundation. Custom builds up certain ways of conduct-
ing one's self. The individual who fails to conform not only suf-
fers the pain of disapproval but runs the risk of greater menoco.
This strong preference for certain types of behavior could easily
develop into a sense of obligation and an insistence that the
individual n ought to conform and do thus and so. But this social-
ly developed conscience is not the same as the conscience of Which
we usually speak,
2, Obligation as a unique experience.
In response to the "you-ought" of society there is an "I-ought"
of the individual, otherwise the sense of obligation loses its
meaning and becomes merely a request or demand. The child at first
hears and acts according t& what others say is its obligation,
but this in time awakens in him his own moral sense, an "I-ought"
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which is unique, expressible in no other terms. It is very dif-
ferent from the feeling that it is expedient to do this because
others desire it. If it were not so, it would be impossible for
28
an individual to rise above the moral ideal of society,
"The social use of the word , , , appeals to a strand of self-
judgment which is original with every individual, and in this sense
belongs to original human nature," 29
But can it be called instinctive?
3, Relation to instinct.
Hocking seems to be certain that conscience cannot be classed
as instinct, yet his statement ot the position which it holds is
not very will defined. It is the chief factor in the remaking
of human nature; therefore it must stand over against all the
instincts and judge them. Is it then the whole will to power
which has been seen to do something of the same thing," or is it
separate and unique like self-consciousness? Hocking's view^ as
he states it, is that
"conscience stands outside the instinctive life of man, not
as something separate, but as an awareness of the success
or failuranof that life in maintaining its status and its
growth," 30
That is, conscience is an insistence on the agreement of the
expression of the instincts with the policy of the total will
to power. His further interpretation he takes up in a negative
way under sin.
It is easier to explain conscience psychologically than
physiologically. It is still easier to be sure of its existence
than to explain it even psychologically. Hocking has at least
found conscience as a rational will acting consistently and
seeking to promote that which seems best to satisfy its needs.
He could hardly have made it more significant.
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II, Fundamental theory of value.
It is difficult to work out a theory of value, partly because
51
we discover that we do not know what we truly desire, partly
because many of the things which we desire conflict with each
pther. But there seems to be one persistent, though not universal
demand to which a theory should conform, and that is that whatwer
the conditions for achiev ing value, it should be possible for
every individual to meet them, 1^
A, Satisfaction of the whole self.
First of all, Hocking is sure that whatever is truly valuable
will satisfy the whole self, and not merely one or more fragments
of the self. That it is impossible to satisfy each separate de-
sire is obvious^ for they constantly conflict. Separate desires
are subordinate to the whole self and its need. Hocking has express-
ed this fact in his address on the"Necessary and Sufficient Condi-
tions of Human Happiness," He points out there the two aspects of
the self: the "excursive" or active self, and the "reflective"
self. The first necessary condition for happiness is a normal
relationship between these two phases of ourselves, "To cram our-
selves wholly into every act of expression is the first and suffi-
cient principle of happiness,"
Stoicism is not the true theory of value because it emphasizes
the reflective self and neglects the excursive. An extreme altru-
ism stxch that I find happiness not through any of mfr own success-
ful achievements but entirely through the success of God'£ or the
race, or some principle^ that is, "vicarious happiness",' is not
final either, for it fails to give a motive for whole-souled
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effort and tends too much toward resignation. It also fails to
satisfy the excursive self. Happiness is not simply an inner state
achieved regardless of activities. We must be able to know and
bend our efforts toward or cooperate with that which is leal in
order to satisfy the whole self, 34
1, Discipline versus Liberation,
But if we are to Satisfy the whole self as over against all
the various desires that arise within us, what is to happen to
those which are not satisfied, and what is to become of our free-
dom, the freedom to asrert our impulses? Hocking has two very
interesting short chapters on the problem of discipline and fre<=>*
dom in his Human Nature and its Remaking . In tracing the develop-
ment of Rousseau's theory, he points out the growth of a discip-
linarian view from the original one of liberation. So with Hegel,
and so with others. Some instincts and desires have to be control-
led by other inwtincts and desires, Nietzsche granted freedom to
the powerful elements of human nature and in doing so had to
subordinate other elements sternly. Satisfaction for some tenden-
cies of life "means organizing the whole life on their own prin-
35
ciple." The present movement of expressionism, Hocking feel*,
is beginning to draw the same conclusions," and must eventually
do so, for the man who is simply a bundle of single desires is
not so much free in expressing them as he is controlled by them.
He has no unity, no purpose. Even the Freudians have shifted
their emphasis from the evil of repression to the necessity of
sublimation,""*6 True freedom belongs to the man who is in contro 1
of his desires. Liberation involves discipline.
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2, Art independent standard.
It has "been said that a true value must satisfy the entise
self, and that this necessarily involves the subordination of
some desires to others, a freedom in controlling and in trans-
forming desires rather than a freedom of undisciplined assertion
of desires. But what standard will be the guide in this relating
of desires so as to unify the self as a whole? Hocking thinks
that it must be "an independent standard" , that is; something
involving the outer objects of value rather than the inner in-
stincts or desires of the valuer, A theory of value is
"likely to find itself dealing with an ultimate court which
gives laws to nature, rather than receiving laws from na-
ture," 57
B, Value and the "whole- idea,"
We have seen Hocking's skepticism of any theory of value
based on instincts, desires or feelings, with its dangerous ten-
dency toward liberation. To him thought or idea is more important
in any que tion of morality; for thought can encompass the whole
self, can relate its various parts and can search for that inde-
pendent standard which determines values. This is a most important
part of his theory of ethics,
1, Idea basic in morals.
Hocking recognizes the tendency in biology, psychology, and
pragmatism to neglect if not discard the intellect 1," in favor of
instincts and emotions which seem to be in control even over
reason, in many instances. Especially has this been true in
relation to religion. Its inner personal characteristics and
intangible objects of worship have caused this. His meeting of
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the tendency has not been to reverse the process and discard
feeling in iravor of idea, at least not entirely; but to link the
two. His thesis is "that there is no such thing as feeling apart
from idea; that idea is an integral part of all feeling." 58
Knowledge is the goal of feeling. Ideas are yb cessarf",' usually,"
to communicate feeling from person to person. Feelings are dis-
tinguished as religious or otherwise by their objects and accom-
panying ideas. The idea is a permanent thing," the feeling a tran-
sient. Some seek to separate the two in an ideal of a theoretical
use of idea free from feeling biases, but this can be attained
only partially. Some feeling mpst necessarily be involved, to
a small extent at least.
Since, therefore, Hocking conceives idea or thought as fund-
amental, his theory of value is based on and determined by idea
(or, more properly, idea-feeling), and what satisfies it^" rather
than on the purely instinctive or emotional phases of life. Thus
in the realm of morals, a person has already made the "longest
step" toward any certain value when he has gained the idea of
the virtue, cleanliness, or good-will, for example. ' This
same viewpoint is shown in his book on Morale and its Enemies ,
There he points out the necessity on the soldier's part of a
steadfast belief in his task, to back up the instincts and feel-
40
ings which play their part in morale,
Hocking's idealism here is very pronounced. Thought or mind
is the substance of the universe. Macintosh has given a very
41
critical review of his absolute idealism. The scope of this
thesis does not include such a discussion. Naturally however a
theory of reality based on mind as over against matter makes
an intelligent will possible, makes choice and hance ethics possi-
ble, and raises the level of the values.
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2, The idea or reality: the "whole- idea?
But Hocking's use of "idea" needs to be clarified. It is
no single idea of which he is speaking. He has placed intellect,
the thought-world, above the instinctive and emotional worlds
in importance. Moreover, he has contributed the thaory of a
"whole-idea" or idea of reality, an important characteristic «f
and determinant of values in every individual.
Hocking claims that every idea which is born in a human mind
finds its place in and becomes a part of one all-inclusive view
of the whole, an outlook on the world. From the very first one has
an idea of the whole, simple as it may be. This "whole-idea" of
course is modified constantly by new laeua, yet its permanent
existence can be affirmed throughout all variations just as there
is one fundamental food-idea in mankind th ough the food sub-
stances vary everywhere.
This whole-idea is really one»s idea of reality. There is
-?n
the human mind an interest in reality per se . and every idea
is connected in its ultimate meaning with the idea of reality
which one holds. The oonception of the closeness of this rela-
tionship of ideas may be seen in this statement:
"Ideas # , , are not what we think gf» they are what we thin 1 -
with. Now whatever else the unity of consciousness may mean,
it also means that there is no isolated action of ideas, but
that I think with all of them at once in each moment 1
,
though
the 'bearing* of any given idea upon any given experience may
be very remote," 42
Too remote to be certain of, one might comment. It is interesting
to note, though it has little direct bearing on our subject^ that
Hocking hare and elsewhere denies sub-consciousness in the usual
sense of the word, Svery idea however dim plays its part through
the whole-idea, in every action, according to him. There is no
danger then from a dominant sub-conscious self which interferes
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with the work of the will,
a, Determinant of values.
It is this whole-idea which determines how * person looks
at things]? and what values they have for him. Out* attitudes
to some extent give value to objects; value which changes as
our moods change or as we get a truer perspective. Our idea of
reality sets the ends for which owe lotions and feelings should
strive,
"All valuing (and so all feeling! is a way of knowing objects
with one's whole-idea , , , An object of value is an object
in which my whole-idea finds some peculiar ease and suffi-
ciency of application, " 4^
In Man and the State the same thought is expressed in an inter-
esting way; "An individual is a unique perception of value," at
44
work in rjudging experience,"
This is a splendid example of a synoptic view of value, Em-
pirical values are criticized in relation to each other and sys-
tematized in the light of the whole. It is the only way to avoid
inconsistency and is the only justified basis on which to make
a choice when there is a conflict of values,4^
b. The real as the good.
If the whole-idea determines what values are to any #an, it
is very important what kind of a whole-idea one has. For example
it makes a great deal of difference whether one judges the whole
as good or evil. If one's idea of reality is that the real is
good, one»s whole system of values will bo on a higher level
than that of a view which sees reality as evil. Reality is that
independent standard spoken of above ( II, A, 2 ) and Hocking
assefcts that the Real is good, that evil can be conquered and

is therefore not on the same plane ox reality with that which
opposes -t. To the extent that one's idea of the whole approaches
~t>ality itself, to tnat e^.ent one's values will be true or" ideal
values,
0« i'ran-.. tion to the txod-idea.
As has been s«*_d, everyone has his whole-idea, but there are
gre~t diiiei.e*^ces *u conceptions aoout the whole. It is religion's
t~s* to put * uxvxne *nLerpretation on the whole and thus effect
wiae transition from tne wuole-iue~ to what iiocicing calls the
God-idea, xuo .alidity of this divine interpretation of reality,
na its effect on ethical theory is reserved for discussion in
a later section under the heading of religion,
u, w-isvalue; Sin,
+n the meantime w© need to touch on auother phase of Hocking's
theory of value, namely, the negation of value, or sin,
-he conception of sin is in some disrepute just now but Hock-
jag sees no Justification in doing awi~y with it. There are three
wurrent r^liacies regarding sin which he points out; the fallaay
vf cancelling s-n oy over oalM.noing it with merit; the fallacy
of custom, the universality ox *xn dulxing the sensitiveness to-
•«*ru xt; and the fallacy of asserting primitive impulses as nat-
ural and therefore right, oasciousness cannot entirely do away
..xth the sense of sin even by cancellation, for it is aware,
however dimly, of an inconixatency in the policy of the self,
oin is the deliberate refusal to eat on an impulse according to
-he best Intere&ts ox the central instinct, the will to power.
Or, m the light of his theory ox the whole-idea, we suppose sin
oulu be refined a refusal to take into account the ultimate
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e**ning Ox an a^t in the light of one's idea of reality,
1, .ain deed.
There are two types of sin: that which is evident in speci-
fic deeds, -nd that which may be called a status, sinful deeds
j.e those such as are descrioed in the foregoing discussion,
.in may be thought ox as oiind»ess f a shutting of one's eyes to
whe «iuer reawhe» ox icnowleoge, bin is an individual affair. The
only reason that society can say that such and such things are
-xnful, is that souie kinds of behavior are so far below the
^evel of the average inte^etation of the will to power that
they can be assumed to contradict the individual's conscience,
i»i£t j thougat of as untruth for it is false to
he unspoken implication of one's actions. Society assumes that
whe individual acts according to hie best knowledge, when he
Ow. not he is xal&e to that expectation, he is living an un-
truth, committing a sin,
4, «b ytatUS,
hocking's view of sin does not permit the old conception of
original xn, out he uoe» recognise a state of sin apart from
specific deeds. That is, a person's moral status would be his
„a**r«cter, uis standards of cnoices. In case anyone reached the
pl-ce wnere he did not pie xer the good at the cost of moral ef-
fort he woulu nave reacnea the status of sin. It is a common
experience to oe conscious of many previous failures to live up
to one's best. Each delioerate choice for what is less than the
-est adds something to the status of sin. The significance of
this status cannot be asserted dogmatically, hocking feels that
_t involves somenow a loss of immortality, out he is not clear
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.0 just what extent. He finds it reasonable that sin should be
a matter of deep concern to mankind, for inevitably man seeks
-he good in life and is restless when conscious of any exclusion
.rom that good, His will to power is ultimately a will to over-
come death, ana religion has made him sensitive to that which
mmy thwart this will,
30 Exi&tence oi moral dilemmas.
Sin is an evidence of freedom and therefore there can be no
cause of ©in in the sense that sin necessarily results from cer-
tain sequences of action or thought. But nevertheless Hocking
oxplais the possibility of sin by the existence of moral dilemmas
which make wrong choices very easy.
Right enort involves deliberation yet deliberation can never
be complete. One may cooie to a decision too soon and thus sin, or
too l«*te and lose the chance for right action, a second dilemma
.oncerns association with others, A moral life involves social
ontact, yet all such contact is with imperfect and sinful pers-
ons or par Lies, or institutions, third dilemma arises in con-
nection with the moral authority of society. The authority of
the leader or of the group is inevitable and necessary, yet it-
is also necessary to maintain one's power of individual moral
choice. It is difficult t«> ce<jp the oalance between these two,
Houking sees a fourth dilemma in the fighting for one's convic-
tion ox rxght. The danger of arousing purely personal hostility
is great, yet it is wrong to let a moral issue remain unchallenged
juot a or fear of going too far in one's opposition,
Tae fifth dilemnia sums up all the others, 47 There must
^6 a consideraole risk of wrong-doing involved in the attempt
to do right, This is moral adventure. But it is the total will

~9
toward -ood woich counts. X* this is strong, occasional sins
.0 sometimes add to its strength by the remorse which they
cause,
•
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III. Evaluation of society and the state.
With this understanding of Hooicing8s psychology and his
theory of value as it rebates in particular to the indivi-
dual, we may turn to his theories of society and the state,
ani later to art and religion. We wish to learn what values
he finds in these, what standards he has for judging them
and what ideals he thinks they should strive to realise,
A. Four postulates of a good sooiety.
In general, sooiety, or the custom which it sets up, aids
the individual in his development, It eliminates many of the
difficulties of learning by experience; it guides development
into a common direction, and maintains a minimum level of
individual attainments. It not only facilitates the indivi-
dual's own development but adds to it, It increases the com-
plication and length of time preliminary to the satisfaction
of any instinot. This strengthens self-oontrol, enables the
individual to live in a more oomplex environment, and enlarges
the meaning of the whole process. It also sets a limit to the
range of objects to which any one individual must attend. The
greater t#e civilization the more selective a man becomes,
and the smaller is the range, proportionately of his objects.
48
This is a normal direction of individual development.
Yet society has also been repressive. It has forced indi-
viduals to conform to its own interests rather then conform-
ing to theirs; it offers only limited opportunity to the
individual because there is such competition in the use of
material equipment; and it hinders individual expression by
its fixities of customary behavior. These repressive
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aspects of society ought to be corrected in so far as possible,
flocking sets up as his norm for society tha individual life
with its natural tendency to transform itself as discussed
under the dialectic of the will (p. ). With this as a stan-
dard he states four postulates of a good society,
1. Identity of social will with individual will.
The first postulate with whioh a good sooiety mpst comply
is that:
"What others wish me tojfce must be identical with what
I myself wish to be. n &0
Man's primary right is to his own development. Society, made
up of individuals, must foster the development of its members.
It has no right to use a person merely as means to its ends.
a. Helps toward achievement of this ideal.
No sooiety has achiaved this ideal, yet there are some
existing conditions which help this identity of the social
and the individual will. The fact that the first influence
of society on the individual comes through the family and
friends who are most interested in his personal growth is such
a help. In the second place, the emergence, of leaders - seers,
prophets, priests and scholars - "reoommenders" of ideals,
has aided Moiety in setting up standards whioh are just to
the individual. These achieve, as much as is humanly possible,
the essential disinterestedness which makes possible the
choosing of ideals whioh are fair to both the individual and
to society. Yet the danger of too great abstraction of ideals
arises, and here again men have found a natural way out of the
difficulty. Abstraction in one extreme calls forth abstraoton
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in an opposite extreme, and the individual must ohoose between
them. This offsets the tendency to blind following of authors
ity.
Another factor which aids the identity of the ideals of
society with those of the individual is admiration, which
prompts the individual to seek for himself those things which
he admires in others, Society points out to him what he really
wants. This is the chief function of education in Hocking's
view. It hastens the development of the will by exposing the
instincts to the right stimuli. The process of arousing the
will through education inevitably tends to produce a type,
and there is the danger of refuting this first postulate, But
education also strives to stimulate growth beyond the type
and draw out individuality. 1
b. Its insufficiency.
But it is impossible for a great number of individuals,
each seeking self-development, to live together without
making some adjustments. There is not room enough for the
full development of each. This i deal alone, then
;
is insuffi-
cient. To it must be added a swoond which shall provide a
standard by which the justiwe of social relationships can
be tested.
2. Subordination of competitive to non-competitive
interests.
We have to give up something in order to have the advan-
tage of social life. Many have over-estimated this loss,
Hocking feels, for often the laws of society which seemingly

repress the individual's instincts, really express the truest
interpretation of those instincts, the interpretation which
the natural dialectic of the will would of itself work out.
Vet to insure the freest possible social existence, a good
society should comply with this second postulate:
"Every competitive interest must be so transformed or inter-
preted as to be non-competitive, or an ingredient in a
non-competitive interest." 52
This does not mean the abolition of competition, for a certain
amount of it is inevitable and desirable to stimulate social
advance.
a. Possibility of attainment of this ideal.
There are some ne^ds which always will be competitive.
Such are the fundamental economic needs for there is a limit
to the supply of materials required for their satisfaction.
Others, those which Hocking has called the necessary interests,
are non-competitive. Whatever is created in the realm of
rhythm or order, art or idea, thereby enriches ell. It is
necessary then to ensure the subordination of the competitive
to the non-competitive interests as the will to power deals
with them both. Can the will to power be primarily non-com-
petitive?
Power itself seems competitive, yet any power over others
must be considerate of their welfare, for it depends on their
strength. It is in the growth of this power that it is dis-
covered that he who is to be most sure of his control over
others must secure it by their free consent. In other words
he must gain his power by serving them rather than by competing
with them. And his power if it is to be unlimited must be
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in the realm of idea, rather than in the competitive fields.
Thus the will to power may become non-competitive,
b. Necessity of the state for its realization.
Yet in order that all competitive interests shall be
subordinated to non-competitive interests there is necessary
some more inclusive force than any will to power of an indi-
vidual or even of groups of individuals. The state is necessayy
for the realization of this second postulate. For the state,
in
as we have already seen^ Hocking's view, is the necessary out-
come of the will-circuits of men, "The state is the objective
condition through which a non-competitive satisfaction of the
will to power becomes possible," 53 The state is necessary,
though not sufficient. But the discussion of the state must <
come later. We simply note here that unorganized society is
not adequate in meeting the requirements which Hocking sets
up as its ideals,
3, Provision for change in institutions.
Ideals, laws," and customs within society are embodied in
institutions. Thus institutions preserve values for society
and guide the individual as he seeks the meaning of his life.
Yet they have not always been of such service, nor are they
today, for too often they preserve custom beyond the time of
its usefulness and so bring social difficulties, Man is adapt-
ed to hardship and grows strong in overcoming difficulties,
but there is no need in preserving evil just for this purpose.
There is enough without our efforts to produce it,
Jusfr as the adult is more highly sensitive than a child
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to pain and wrong, though he has greater self-control, so^ as
civilization advanoes^men "become more sensitive to evil^ and
the old physical pains "become social wrongs. The need constant-
ly arises to change customs, laws and ideals. Therefore a
third postulate for a good society i$ thatc
''Whatever in institutions tends at any time to deform human
nature shall be freely subject to the force of dissatisfac-
tion naturally directed to change them." 54
The conserving forces of society shall not be so impervious
to change that they become the preservers of that which is
now epril. The world now is perhaps more ready to change than
ever before when new knowledge comes assuring that the proposed
reforms will truly reform.
4. Conserving force proportionate to certainty.
It is readily recognized that a good sooiety must be ready
to change its institutions in the light of new and advanced
ideals. Yet, as Hocking points out, it is a serious thing to
change them too hastily for they render a great service in
conserving the experience of the race. Therefore a good society
must comply with this fourth postulate:
"Conserving force shall be proportionate to certainty." ^5
The institution must he willing to change easily only those
ideals or laws of whose permanent value it is not certain,
and must hold fast to the values of which it is assured.
These four postulates, it may be noticed, are in two pairs,
the first tww offsetting each other and the dangers which might
arise from compliance with either one of them alone; and so
with the last two. Obviously they are ideals to which society
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ought to conform, and not statements of actual conditions.
They are hardly recognized by actual societies as yet. Never
theless there are observable tendencies in these directions,
and the ideals are based, as Hocking's own theory would main
tain, on what experience has pointed out to be best.
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B. The State.
Hooking names that process in sooiety which draws together
56
and form s a group the "oommotive process". There are two
phases of this process, that which promotes the activity of the
group, and that which develops the principles by which the
group may live successfully together. In the political realm
these two phases are seen in history and law respectively.^
In the psychological realm the two might be referred to will
and Judgment. As the group's life is extended it tends to be-
come more and more stable because of the accumulated results
of these two processes. The stability of environment thus
developed is, primarily, the state.
1. Necessity for the State.
In searching for the values which the state has to offer
or ought to offer, one is interested in knowing whether or
not there is a necessity for the state's existence, for necessity
gives greater significance to the worth of any object. Hooking
sees the state as a necessary, and inevitable grouping.
a. Psychological basis: will-circuits.
We have already seen that Hooking finds thm necessity for
the state in man's conscious purpose, his will. As Hobbes
found the state established on a "pursuit of power after power, ,T ^'
so Hocking sees the will to power as the basis; that is, the
will to make over the world by understanding, directing and
58
using the forces in the world. The social expression of this
will to power, t#e will-circuit, is the psychological foundation
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of the state.
The* will demands some things for its complete satisfaction
whioh the individual oommot provide. He oan gain self-oontrol
,
maintain those oontaots whioh are necessary and helpful, keep
his ambition awake, and learn to discern readily new truths
and values. But there are some requisites whioh oan be supplied
only by something other than the individual. For instance,
the work of the individual must have a permanent influence, and
that the individual cannot secure. Also the individual cannot
supply himself by his own efforts with adequate knowledge
for understanding either himself or hi8 surroundings. The vast
accumulations of learning of all kinds are made accessible to
the seeker by something more inclusive and $ore permanent
than any individual oan supply. And finally, for the advance
of the will to power there must be freedom from catastrophe
and less due to disturbed conditions of any kind; there must
be insured a state of justiw where no unreasonable fortune
or misfortune will hinder the opportunities for success.
Obviously the individual can not furnish such security for
himself. The state exists to supply these conditions. We shall
consider these various function^ of the state a little later
under its purpose.
b. Implications.
In the meantime there are certain implications in the
assertion of the state's necessity that need to be faced. It
implies, for example, that the anarchists and pluralists are
wrong. It implies also that the state has a unique place

39
among the social groups. Hooking considers eaoh of these.
(1) Anarchism.
There are people who deny outright the necessity of the
state. The philosophical anarchists have the following reasons
for their view, as Hocking understands them. In the first place
they have faith man's ability to liye without the state,
faith in his fundamental tendency to cooperate with his fellow-
men and treat them with enough fairness and good will to pre-
serve order without an over-ruling government, Furthermore
the state has restrained the liberty of men, and freedom is one
of the primary values in the estimation of an anarchist. No
other grouping in society makes such absolute demands on its
membership as does the state. Again, she state, in its laws,
prescribes what is good and thus takes away from individuals
a large element of choice which has distinct moral value. The
state thus tends to weaken the £oral fibre of man, claim the
anarchists. Finally, the state has abused its power - a criti-
cism whioh is readily granted by all but whioh does not neces-
sarily call forth the deduction which the anarchists draw from
it.
Hooking has answered the anarchists chiefly b£ affirming
the impossibility of their view. His claim, as we have seen,
is that the state is a necessary outcome of the overflow of the
wills to power of men, a reality essentially implied in their
will-oirouita. Therefore all criticisms whioh the anarchists
raise are really applied only to particular states and not
to the State per se , in spite of all their statements to the

40
contrary. The txistence of the State ia willed by every man. 60
He seems dogmatic as he so emphatically and shortly denies
the possibility of the anarchists' position. He has been
criticized both by those who agree with him fairly wtll and by
his opponents. 6 ^- Buchanan aoouses him of timidity and hesi-
tanoy in replying to the arguments of the anarchists, and fur-
62thermore of idealizing the state. That he has idealized the
state is certainly true. With the states of today so under fire
of criticism the arguments of the anarchists and others should
have received more attention.
(2) Pluralism.
Besides the anafohists and their denial of the neoessity
of the state, there are the politioal pluralists who Admit
the state's existence but are not willing to grant to it the
uniquely powerful position it holds. They deny its right of
sovereignty. Society is divided into many groups; why should
the state be the most inclusive one? Why should any one group
dominate over the others?
Hooking has found the politioal pluralists inconsistent
in their position. For example, though they complain of the
state's sovereignty they have not actively proposed to give up
its unique power, or its praotioal monopoly of force. Moreover,
in their attempt to deny the state's right of sovereignty, they
have pointed to the very evident influence on the state, and
even control of it, exerted by some supposedly subordinate
group such as economic organizations. In reality, then, they
are complaining that the state is not sovereign enough, tather
than that it is too mueh so. For if it is undesirable for the
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state to be under the control of any particular interest of man
then the state must be made stronger, certainly not weaker, 6 *5
To answer the pluralist arguments adequately, Hocking goes
quite carefully into this problem of sovereignty. It suggests
to him some distinct values of the state.
19} Right of sovereignty.
Before any decision as to the justification of the state's
assumption of sovereignty, one must first determine the distinc-
tion between the state and other groups within society. Hocking
has done this on the basis of extent in space and time, relations
between members, origins, and types of power. Each of these cnn
be taken up briefly.
(a) State distinguished from other groups.
In spatial extent, Hocking says that "It is not alone the
state that is everywhere: it is each state that is everywhere."6^
This he asserts because of the interpenetration of the interests
of states. And just because the state is so world-wide, allowing
the proper qualification of the term, it makes it possible for
all other groups to be just as large or small, as provincial or
universal as they iieed to be. The expansion of the territorial
interests of any state has not caused the limitation of any of
the other groups, but rather the contrary. In the same way, the
permanency of the state or aim of permanency, its time-extent,
ha q been of definite value in the conservation of the worth of
other social groups. It has aided their permanency. This will
be touched on under the nurposes of the state.
The state has for it* basis of membership the most inclusive of
bases. Whereas other groups choose bleod relationships, interests,
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skills or what-not, the state's membership includes all within
a given territory. This territorial bond, "coresidence", is not
the essential of political membership," but it is its "sufficient
sign", The very inclusiveness of the state, Hocking feels, lends
greater opportunity and freedom to other groups to utilize the
more personal bonds.
•The state is distinguished from ijany social groups in that its
origin is natural rather than artificial. That is, a permanent
need demands its existence whereas most groups are formed volun-
tarily on transient needs. Here Hocking rejects the contract-the-
ory of the state. "The state originates in man's natural impulse
to become the conscious arbiter of his own social destiny." 65
Groups may have at least three types of power: physical force,
the power of bargain, and the power of prestige. The state has all
three but it is only in the first that it claims any distinction.
Here it tends to monopolize the right to use force in order to
make possible the free play of the other types of power in society
The possibility of physical force usually prevents the full devel-
opment of prestige and bargain power and therefore it must be elim
inated as much as possible between individuals or groups of soc-
iety. This can be done only by placing the right of force in the
hands of that organization which represents the total will, not
the partial will, of society, and which will thus relate moral
power with physical. That organization is the state. Thus the
state can be distinguished from other social groups not only by
its extent in space and time, its basis of membership, and its
origin, but by its unique monopoly of physical force. In each of
these cases the state has claimed priority in one way or another
over other social groups, and has felt itself justified because.
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by so doing, it allows and aids the necessary freedom of development
of other groups, and the establishment of right relationships be-
tween them,
(b) Meaning of its sovereignty.
If this be true, and Hocking believes it so 7 the state's right
of sovereignty has been practically established. The state does not
claim exclusive control of authority, and sovereignty does not
mean that. Y/hen a supreme authority is formed, it does not abol-
ish the less important ones,' It helps to relate them properly to
each other. Also, when a state claims sovereignty, it does not
claim to be above reproach. Sovereignty does mean, according to
Hocking, "that capacity for reaching a final decision which is
Pi Piinvolved in the power to act at all," This involves moral re-
sponsibility. Sovereignty also means that the decisions of the
state, just because they can be final, must take precedence over
the decisions of individuals and groups.
Hocking fails to satisfy in this discussion. He has failed^
for one thing, to distinguish the state clearly from other organ-
izations, Maclver67 has criticized his use of the will to power
as the distingui shying basis of the state on the grounds that
many other phases of society, for example, the economic order,
are based on the same central instinct. This hardly seems valid,
however, because Hocking's claim is that the whole will to power,
and not any partial expression of it, demands the state. The
economic order does not reveal the whole will. Criticism might
better be based on other things. The state's universality per-
mits freedom as to size, extent/ duration etc. in other groups 9/
he claims. It ought to, perhaps, but he sometimes fails to
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distinguish between the ideal and the actual. How be sure, for
example, whether the expansion of the state makes possible the
expansion of the economic interests, or vice versa? Which is the
cause and which the effect?
Sabine68 points out Hocking's avoidance of the whole modern
issue between the functional and territorial theories of the state'
membership. He simply assumes the latter, Maclver67 suggests that
the differentia of the state might be, not in the instincts," will^
or any attribute of human nature at all, but in its use of a par-
ticular medium such as law. Hocking has sought an apriori theory
of the state, has tried to meet its difficulties, but inevitably
has been too normative because of his method.
But it is a normative discussion that we need, We are seeking
not only for the values to be found in the state but also for the
ideals which Hocking holds for the state," and though he has dealt
too briefly with the critics of the state, on the whole his argu-
ments for its necessity and its right of sovereignty ha-ge been
well founded. He has studied the state and placed it in its own
relationship to the satisfaction of the will to power, his ulti-
mate goal,
2, Purpose: the establishment of the objective conditions
of the will to power.
We have been dealing with the necessity for the state, not
only justifying its existence and its sovereignty, but declaring
that without it certain essential conditions which are needed by
individuals to satisfy their wills to power can not be supplied.
We turn to the ourrose of the state. In outlining its purpose
Hocking has given his conception of what it ought to provide.
We complete here, then, his ethical theory of the state.
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In a preliminary discussion of the state's purpose Hocking
points to its function of making history and defines history as a
series of important happenings which result from the choice, based
69
on intelligence and experience, of any group of people. Yet the
making of history has no value in itself , The state makes history
for the sake of the interests of its members*
"Its function as educator is its most characteristic function,
and its chief contribution to history is its product in men, . •
the form of the state's aim is the making of history; its sub-
stance is the making of 'men, " 7
This broad statement has been severely criticized because it
assumes a task which is certainly not unique with the state* Neither
has it been true that education is its characteristic function.
One writer71 has said that there is a conflict between Hocking's
head and his heart. He sometimes lets his enthusiasm for the state
overrule his impartial analysis of its functions. He sometimes
credits it with values which it has made possible but which are
not due to itself alone.
In a later discussion he goes more deeply into the purpose:
"The state exists for the sake of making it possible for indivi-
dual men to realize their fully interpreted wills to power, , •
Briefly, the state exists to establish the objective conditions
for the will to power in human history: this is our thesis," y^
The objective conditions necessary have already been briefly men-
tioned: a permanent order; an available storehouse of wisdom; and
impersonal justice. These are summed up in objective right,
a, A permanent order.
Man naturally desires his wvrk to have permanent effect, yet
in himself there is no way to insure it. The state exists as a
dependable and permanent, or would-be permanent^ organization which
can assume the responsibility of preserving the values which are

created within it. The will to power has found this method of se-
curing its full realization. The state offers it the value of a
future which is more or less calculable and preserves the cumulated
values of the past so that the various arts, enterprises and cul-
ture have the opportunity of continuous progress. By this assurance
of permanence it stimulates creative effort on the mart of indivi-
dual wills, for it enables men to build their work into the wtoble
process of history,
b. An available storehouse of wisdom,
The second rrurpose of the state closely supplements the first.
In order to realize their "fully interpreted wills to power", men
must be able to work with as little waste of time and energy as
possible, The state exists to store up the wisdom acquired in the
past and make it available for men. This function is the law-making
and law-administering activity of the state, "Law makes men aware
of the bearings of their actions ." 73 That is," it points ofct the
consequences which the individual alone cannot see. It shows the
relation of his act to the acts snd the welfare of others. It can
do this because of its long, cumulative experience. Another value
which the state provides through its law is the proper delating
of the standards of the different groups which it includes. For
example, attention has often been called to the divergence between
the social code and the econor.ic code. One set of morals is adopt-
ed in social life, another, perhaps, in business life. It is the
duty of the state, as Hocking sees it, to relate these properly,
unifying then under a siiigle ideal, on the principle that:
"Nothing can be socially right which is economically wrong;
Nothing can be economically right which is socially wrong;
- the long run being understood in each case," 74
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No individual can do this and make it effective to the extent to
which the state can.
c# Impersonal justice.
The third objective condition of the will to power which the
state exists to establish is a condition of justice. This is more
than an interest in just behavior. It is an attempt to create a
condition in which all men, even those with weak tendencies toward
righteoueness, may deal fairly as a rule rather than as an excep-
tion. It is an attempt to build a just state of mind, "It means
the elimination of irrelevant disabilities in every interest of
life," 75 For instance, if sex does not influence voting capacity,
then the state in establishing justice must eliminate that irrele-
vant factor.
In order to establish j istice the state must undertake some
educational activity for the sake of developing the personality
of its members. Personality alone, Hocking asserts, estimates
fairly the worth of the things it produces. This of course is an
ideal aim which the state can never realize, but it must strive
toward its attainment.
In h's little book on the Present Status of the Philosophy
of Law and of Rights f Hocking emphasizes this ideal of justice.
It is stated negatively as "no injustice," 76 That is, no deliber-
ate sacrifice of justice should ever be allowed. The true stan-
dard for setting up laws is the development of the powers of the
individual. Whatever is certainly kncwn to promote this end is
valid as law. Social utility has often cided in determining;
this law. Self-development Is the only natural right. In order
to secure this the individual has the right of personal liberty:
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in self-management, in seeking social control, and in the control
of nature, 77 He also has the right of security in his environment
security of his own Person, of his contracts and of his aroperty.
Each of these rights is a condition of justice which the state
should aim to secure.
Hocking admits that these three purposes of the st; te are
ideel ones, each of which is being realized by particular states
to a very imperfect degree. Nor could they ever be carried out
completely, at least not by the state alone. Therefore the State
must be an experimenter more than a dictator. In recognizing it-
self as experimental, it wins its "contact with perfection", 78
In holding itself open to criticism and change it is justified
in demanding that its experiments be carried through to a final
proof or disproof.
There is no objection to the setting of high ideals for the
state. The only question is whether the ideals are distinctive of
the state. In setting ur the satisfaction of the will to power,
or self-develo Tnent, as the end, Hocking is in danger of making
the scot>e of the state's functions too large, for that is the
end of the whole of life. The only limitation he sets is that
the state shall establish the objective conditions for the will
to power. Presumably something else establishes the subjective
conditions, perhaps religion. But do not other social groups
besides the state establish objective conditions for the will to
power? He himself admits that the state could never carry out
these purposes alone. It seems then that he might have distin-
guished more carefully the specific values which the state exists
to ensure, Sabine in particular makes this criticism.
The chief criticisms of Hocking* s theory of the state all

center around his exaggerated idealism, Ke claims too much for
it. Yet the ideal values which he sees possible in it are consis-
tent with his whole ethical theory. He looks to religion to aid
the state in fulfilling its high purposes,
3", The state and the church.
There is one more phase of Hocking's ethical theory of the
state which we must consider, and that is its relation to the
church. The aims of church and state lost their identity when
the church rejected territorial limitations, became consciously
universal, and clearly distinguished its religious interests
from the political ones. The state is not to be worshipped, but
rather, is subordinate to religion:
"The good to be realized through religion takes precedence of
the good to be achieved through the state, - as the absolute
transcends the figurative," 88
However, this does not mean that the state is subordinate to the
church, for the latter is not as necessary to religion as the
organization of the state is to politics, so Hocking believes.
What relation then ought to be maintained between the two?
a. Value of religion to the state.
Before determining the relation of the church to the state
it is well to note the values contributed by religion to politi-
cal life, The?e are: first, the uromotidn of "human solidarity"81
,
a necessary foundation for any grouping of men; second, an inter-
est in the good of mankind as a whole; third, a quickening of
conscience and supnort of the moral precepts stored in the law;
fourth, a perspective which stimulates progress, 81 The potential
value of each of these to the state is clearly seen.
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b. The desired relation between church and state.
Religion brings to the state a conscience, an ethic* The
state through its law translates that ethic into its meaning in
life, Entir© independence of each other is bound to be a failure
because each needs the other. The state needs what the church can
give, as has been outlined; the church needs to reraerrber the prac-
tical problems of the state. The tv/o supplement each other in
ministering to the will, religion drawing it baek into touch with
its ultimate sources, the political life thrusting it out into
acitivity, the use of its powers in the production of character.
The state cannot remain independent of the church's influence;
neither can it be passive or neutral in regard to the church's
teachings. Hocking shows very convincingly that the state, whether
or no, necessarily upholds one religious view or other in its
lav.-s, and will if necessary forbid religious practices which go
against its concept of justice, for example, polyganry, or human
sacrifice. Briefly therj the state and church should each recog-
nise the values in the other, and each be free to oppose or crit-
icize the other, though the influence of the church must come
chiefly through the consciences of its individual members, where-
as the state works more as a body. Hocking is pleading for great-
er honesty and realism in the relation between church and state,
says one of the reviewers of Man and the State f very appreciative-
ly. 82
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IV. Art and Religion,
Man.'s fundamental right is self-development, the satisfaction
of his total will to power in its widest reaches of meaning. Both
society and the state form objective conditions for the satisfac-
tion of that will. Is anything else necessary? Hocking asserts
that there is.
Society may he divided into uvo orders: the public, which min-
isters to a man*s "market value"; and the private, which satisfies
his need for sociability, his instinct for "love". Both of these
are necessary to B complete personality, one alternating with the
other. The two, however, are not sufficient to "save" the whole
man, for the private order stimulates some things for which the
public order fails to provide scope and exrirePsion. Art and reli-
gion exist to take care of this incomplete satisfaction.
In primitive society, Hocking reminds us, vox populi was
equivalent to vox Dei . But religion has been superseded in many
of its aspects by social laws and the sciences. Its primary pur-
pose, however, is to minister to the whole need of man. Hence,
its limitation to the spiritual realm makes it none the less
necessary, for by its very nature it supplies that which no other
phase of life can supply, and thus completes the total meaning
of life.
Originally, art and religion were one. Religion gave birth to
the arts, and each to some extent owes its vitality to the initial
impulse given it by religion. Therefore the two can well be i>ut
together under this section, as Hocking "laced them together in
the book guman Mature and its Remaking . We shall see what place
each holds in his ethical theory.
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A. The value of Art,
Art and religion both are in a sense "beyond society", since
they "appeal primarily and directly to the exploring and origina-
tive self". There are many wishes which find expression only in
dreams and in the imagination. No real satisfaction is gained in
this way because they are not definite experiences of the will.
They need to be expressed more adequately.
1. Scope for unexpressed cowers.
Art offers scope for the expression of these desirea,"The
wori-c of art is the dream made objective, permanent, self-conscious,
34
mutual." To some extent the satisfaction of art can be oiily
symbolic, and yet the possession of the ideal, the beautiful, in
objective form stimulates the creative powers of man. Hocking
speaks further of this.
a. Energies increased.
Art has s two-fold effect on the instincts. It makes stronger
the impulses to posses-, and restores fai£h in the ability to
achieve. In general it increases the energies of life by stimu-
lating desires. And in the second place, it carries those increased
energies over into the realm of creativity, the creation of the
beautiful which satisfies one phase of the will to power.
b. Ideal of beauty transferred to all life.
There is an indireat effect of art which adds to its value*
That is the tendency for the ideal of beauty to be generalized
and affect the whole of life. This goes against the current the-
ory that skill gained in one line of work is not transferred to
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another. But that theory is not yet firmly established, and, be-
sides, Hocking insists that the aesthetic interest is vital to
the central current of the will itself, and hence reaches tae
wtioltj. For example, the desire for harmony prompts the will to
power to identify its interests with the state's interests. It pro-
motes equality between partners in -private life* This principle,
however, cannot be carried too far. The artist is not necessarily
one who finds beauty in the expression of all his instincts, The
ideal of beauty is not sufficient to transform all of life,
2, Art not sufficient: religion needed.
The ideal of beauty, taken alone, emphasizes too exclusively
the form rather than the content of life. It would serve little
in dealing with the difficult problems of the world; it would not
approve revolution or reform, Left to itself it would get too far
away from reality. It needs to fcetura occasionally to experience,
even to a knowledge of evil for which it is trying to ftffer a
solution. It needs religion to aid it in offering the full scope
for the satisfaction of man's unexpressed powers, for religion
more perfectly supplies the needs of the whole of life. Why this
is so we will see in the next section.

54
B. The God-idea
.
Hocking's ethical theory reaches its highest development in
religion. Religion, especially Christianity, gives to the will to
t>ower its fullest meaning, and enables tt to transform the in-
stincts to the furtherance of the highest values. It interprets
reality in terms of the good and the divine, and so enables man
to relate his values properly to the ideal values. We can best
discus^ Hocking's views by considering what he means by this char-
acteristic phrase, the "God-idea", and what significance it holds
for him in the science of values. We are reminded at once of his
term, the whole-idea. What relation do the two bear to each other?
1# The whole-idea as God-idea.
The God-idea is simply the whole-idea interpreted by religion
as an idea of a whole which is divine. The God-idea is one kind,
and the truest kind of a whole-idea. It enters into man's idea of
reality very early. Primitive fears and imagination find the
world of Nature insufficient; the sense of mystery already im-
plies a fueling that there is something more, a justice at work,
a God, Perhaps the first God-idea is simply the beginning of the
recognition that man is not alone in knowing the world. He is
largely ignorant, but there is Another that knows. From this sim-
ple origin, the ides of God has developed tremendously. It is
now not so much a question of whether to believe in God, but what
kind of a God to believe in. We are likely to get away from
ethics, but it seems necessary to consider briefly why Hocking
believes that the whole-idea should be a Bod-idea, and then
v/hat conception he holds of God.
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a. Why a God-idea,
In his justification of the interpretation of the whole as
divine, Hocking makes his approach through a criticism of the view
of McTaggart. McTaggart thinks the belief in God difficult if not
impossible because of the presence of evil in the world. Further-
more it is unnecessary, for the values which are commonly attri-
buted to God are reproduced to a sufficient extent in other rela-
tionships. But, Hocking says, McTaggart has based his views purely
on hypotheses and probabilities. If belief in God is a mere hypo-
thesis then he grants that it has no value for him. On the contrary,
he feels that it is based on experience. Men note the powers in
Nature, the unifying of forces, and work back to a Power, God,
As for the personal and moral aspects, they too have been exper-
ienced and are continually being experienced. Even pain and evil
are "transmuted" by association with God, Experience itself
justifies the idea of God as the whole-idea.
But granted that man has these experiences there is still
the necessity of attributing them to some source. Why should it
be God? Hocking falls back on the ontological argument for the
existence of God, Man has an idea of God, This implies an exper-
ience of God; therefore there is such a reality. This "leap from
idea to reality" forms a proof of God's existence, 7
"It is . . , when the world ceases to satisfy us as a premise,
and appears as a conclusion from something more substantial,
that we find God - proceeding then from the world as conclusion
to God as premise," 88
The ontological argument has its dangers and faults biit
Hocking is be commended for his use of an empirical rather than
a purely apriori basis,89 Hocking has gone beyond Hegel's onto-
logical argument chiefly in this respect. The appeal to
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experience must be firmly grounded. Hocking does this as he
takes up worship and mysticism,
b. The attributes of God.
If one's whole-idea must be a God-idea, what kind of a God
most truly represents reality? It is outside the scope of this
thesis to discuss fully Hocking's treatment of the idea of God,
Let it suffice to point out some of the things which he believes
about God, for as we shall see, it is the God-idea which determines
values for him, and we are interested in values,
90God is for Hocking both immanent and transcendent. He is
both within and beyond the world, as its center of power, its will,
God is moral, favoring the good of men, God is personal from
one point of view in his extern' 1 relation as Other to men; imper-
sonal as Law, Energy, the Whole; yet personality is the stronger
idea of the two, and can include the idea of law. This is confusing
but Hocking seems to come definitely to the personal view,
"The relations between man and God have, in the course of reli-
gious history, become more deeply personal and passionate • • •
The soul finds at length its divine companion," 9^
God is not finite; there is no value in a finite God, for rela-*
tionship with Him must be far above the plane of human relation-
ships of love, loyalty, etc, 92 He is the Absolute; the only term
which is great enough to hold true through every expansion of our
understanding of Him, (We might say, also, which is therefore in
danger of being meaningless,) Since He is changeless, it is we
who furnish the change in the world, Ihe Absolute is necessarily
indifferent in some aspects, yet the indifference is absolute
justice: the "only radically creative attitude yet known", 93
It is creative in that it confers value on all the objects of
its attention.
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One of the most fruitful of Hocking's ideas of God, is one
that has already been implied. We can know God, chiefly throuegh
worship, and can establish a personal relationship with Him,the
implications and values of which will be discussed shortly,
c. The God-idea as chief determinant of values.
Just as we found that man's whole-idea determined the level
of his values by giving him a standard by which to judge them,
so the God- idea functions in the same way,
"The use of the God-idea , , , will be the Cj?ief determinant
of the value-level in an£ consciousness." ^4
And again,
"That which chiefly marks the religious soul is a fearless and
original valuation of things . , • as if by fresh contact with
truth itself, it were sure of its own justice,"
The nearer one's whole-idea approaches the true God-idea, the
more will one's velues be the ideal values. They will be seen in
their proper relationship, in the right perspective. False values
can be discarded. Religion aids this approach. Perhaps its fc&ief
value for man lies in this formation of the God-idea,
2, Union with God as the good.
The God-idea which interprets values must also interpret the
full meaning of the will to power. In religion man seeks to unite
his will with the will of the world, the will of God, Worship is
the attempt to so unite with God, to become, for the time being
at least, "what existence is", and it is religion's claim that
this -union with God is the good," the supreme value, for it places
man, it makes life significant in the world; it offers the final
satisfaction of the will to power. Let us see how this is possible
and why it is true.
\
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a. Asceticism.
Union with God cannot become literal. It is impossible to be
a thorough ascetic, to give up all connections with the world and
still maintain life* The principle of alternation needs to be
applied here as elsewhere. That is, man needs to alternate be-
tween the different parts of his life just as he needs to sleep
in order to be more fully awake, or needs to play in order to
work the harder. And there is also need of alternation between
the whole and the oarts, Man cannot do justice to his various
duties unles? he occasionally surveys them as a whole; but it
would be equally impossible to be surveying the whole continu-
ously. The ascetic who seeks union with God must seek also his
fellow men if his religious experience is to have meaning for
himself or them. It is equally true that all who lead lives of
constant activity weaken spiritually and need to turn to God for
a renewal of spiritu 1 poise. It is in worship that man gives up
the partial expressions of his will and finds the whole,
b. Worship and mysticism.
These two may be classed together, for, in Hocking's opinion,
the mystic is the one who achieves to a greater degree what the
ordinary man seeks in worship. The values which result from mys-
ticism are the standards by which to evaluate the results of all
worship, and the methods of the mystics will presumably aid any
religious person who seeks to wor&hip truly,
(1) The purpose of worship.
The purpose of worship has already been spoken of as the
attainment of union with God. Hocking has much to say of this.
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Worship is thought, meditation, the use of our ideas of God; but
it is more than that • It involves the will and "anacts the pre-
sence of God, sets God into the will to work there," 97 It is
more than observation, it is a sharing tn the will of the divi-
nity. There is the assumed need of activity which has found
partial satisfaction in the various ceremonies and rites of wor-
ship but greater satisfaction in application to daily life.
Worship has at times been associated with extreme states of
enthusiasm, and with fanaticisms which have too often discredited
mysticism; but it is undeniable that there have been some true
mystics. These have found communication with God, and their lives
and the authority of their teachings have witnessed to it. The
impulse for worship or mysticism has not gone. Every man has a
"spiritual ambition", a desire to know and at>r>roach God, to be
known by God, and to be recognized for his worth. The strong
man seeks his Strongest in the desire to olace his strength, 98
The wear and tear of our strenuous activities makes the values
of the details of life seem doubtful. We need the vision of the
whole again. We turn instinctively to friendships, to art, to
pleasure, and all the^e help to recover our values; but worship
is the self-conscious, the deli Derate search for a renewal of
the worth-while-ness of life. Work and worship need to alternate.
The mystics have sought this union with God through purga-
tion: self-denial; meditation on God or on objects which embody
the supreme values; and passivity, a recognition that their own
efforts are not sufficient, an attentive expectancy of some ex-
ternal pwer. The result of this preparation has been illumination
and a sense of union with the supreme being which has been very
real but is often difficult if not impossible to explain in words.
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It is a solitary experience. The mystic experience does not come
in a crowd, but the truest mystics have been those who have gone
back to the masses with the light of a new truth on their faces
and an urge to impart it to all. The same principle of alterna-
tion which has already been spoken of under asceticism applies
to the mystic.
(2) Revelation,
Union with God is the general expression for the good which
comes from religion* There are three more specific values which
are found through worship. These are, in Hocking's words, revela-
tion, inspiration, and prophetic consciousness. He discusses
them at some length in his book ghe Meaning of God in Human Ex-
perience
,
and to some extent in his article on the "Illicit
Naturalizing of Religion", though under different temninology
.
The truth which is revealed to the worshipper may not always
be new, but it is his own experience of @od and that in itself
has value. It may not even be clearly defined. He is more sure
that he has truth than of what the truth is. He is in danger of
supplying the meaning himself, but at least he has been assured
of God's existence and knows that communication with Him is pos-
sible. And when he returns to the world he finds himself looking
at it from a new viewpoint. This has helped to uncover new truth,
new ideas of God, new conceptions of law: and right, as a change
in one's whole-idea produces a new conception of value. There
is much partial truth but,' recognising the possible errors,
revelation nevertheless has been of real value to mankind.
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(51 Inspiration.
A second specific value of worship is what Hocking calls
inspiration. The new insight, revelation, comes with sufficient
force to break the old traditional systems of moral thought which
have lost their originality and to give them new significance, vr
else to discard them for "better ones. This is the creativity of
religion. Hocking recalls to our minds some incidents in Tolstoy's
life which illustrate this creativity of a new realization of the
meanings of hitherto unquestioned beliefs. He describes the value
of inspiration elsev/here as "securing freedom by breaking through
Q Q
the determinisms of habit, mood and thought," Religion is
false unless it does thus intensify other values," unless it does
create. Such inspiration usually comes as a result of reflection,
in worship^. It is not found only in religion, but has its fullest
development there, "Worship is the provision which the spiritual
constitution has made for its own perpetual amendment,"100
(4) prophetic Consciousness,
The third value of religion and hence of its distinguishing
characteristic worship is "prophetic consciousness". This, as we
understand Hocking's view, is an understanding of the world and
its purposes such thet the person holding it is able to say that
this which I now do will succeed, will take its place in the hist-
ory of the world and will promote its fundamental nurposes. The
men who have been so assured of the future of their work have been
called prophets. Their prophetic consciousness is a result of
their revelation end inspiration. It is the highest necessary con-
dition of happiness, 101 for happiness is "the continuous undivided
consent of my whole-idea to the experience or activity at hand," * (
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Man must be assured not only of the triumoh of God or of some
principle but he must be able to direct his own efforts so as to
share in that triumph. Though Hocking does not use the word, his
meaning here includes the thought of cooperation with God in the
work of the world.
It is a great thought. Some have drawn back from it as too
presumptuous, too closely associated with a love of power which
might become exaggerated and self-aggressive as the conception
of Nietzsche tends to oe. But there have been great men who have
stood out, sure of their message, firm through all opposition.
These have given the ideal* It points toward immortality. "Our
life is given us: another may be acquired. Immortality, I venture
to think, may be the chief and total object of prophetic COn-
lC*
sciousness."
Prophetic consciousness is contagious just as the assurance
and courage of leaders is contagious. It creates power in others
and hence tends to mold its environment. It builds up around It-
self the unity of purpose which is needed to inHure the contin-
uance of its influence. The religious institution develops for
this purpose, to propagate and give permanence to these prophetic
ideals of men.
c. Relation to problem of evil.
If union with God is to be taken as the good, what does it
have to say of the problem of evil? The Realists would say that
evil is evil and nothing else. This view is not compatible with
religion as Hocking sees it. Therefore it is necessary, for him,
to understand evil as something else than nure evil. As a matter
of fact, he reminds us, men have always assumed that pain can
be explained in terms of good. They have often seen it transmuted.
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C. Christianity,
We have been studying the God-idea in general. The special
requirements, and implications of the Christian Bod-idea, as
Hocking sees them, are the subject of this section,
1, Feeling versus behavior.
The distinctive thing in the ethic of Christianity is that
it places primary value on the attitude, the feeling, the spirit,
rather than on external oehavior. Its God is one who "loves mercy
and not sacrifice", and this idea of God affects the whole value-
level. Hocking suggests the results most interestingly. But first
we would suggest that he might better have used his term "idea-
feeling" here. He has made idea the basis and feeling the accom-
paniment, necessarily involved but not Quite so important or
ermanent, 105 His use of the word feeling here rright very easily
be understood as pure emotion, which is far from his meaning,
a. Value placed on Love,
Christianity's chief emphasis is on Love, a spirit, a
"feeling", rather than a type of behavior. "Thou Shalt love
thy God • . , and , , thy neighbor," Notice, Hocking says,
Jesus' expansion of this thought in the Sermon on the Mount,
"Ye have heard it said, Thou Shalt not kill, . but I say unto
you, Whoever is angry ..." The command to modify our emotions
is usually taken es psychologically impossible and therefore
many have changed Christian teachings into a set of rules
for behavior. Hocking feels that this misses entirely the whole
significance of Christianity, It means to ask just that which
at first seems to be impossible.
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The question is, can all of it be so changed?
Pain seems to be transmuted through association. Suffering
is forgotten in a common cause. May it not be, then, that all
possible evil, even including human sin, is transmuted through
association or union with God who is greater than all human
groupings and above their defects? Only a supreme power could
necessarily effect the change from evil to good. Only a power
with whom men could get in personal relationship would be able
to give to men the poise necessary to face evil fearlessly.
And such a power is God, It is
"God as intimate, infallible associate , • , that alone is
capable of establishing human peace of mind and thereby
human happiness," 104
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b. Transformation of instincts required.
The emphasis on love in Christianity requires for its ful-
filment the complete transformation of the instincts. Especially
must the will to p-wer, that most central of all instincts, "be
brought unaer the guidance of its principle, for no religion
can exist over instincts which have been merely repressed. Its
strength must oe in their transformation, in their subordination
to its purposes. Two examples will suffice to show Hocking's
conception of how Christianity satisfies this requirement: the
transformations of pugnacity and ambition- those which seem
most opposed to the idea of love,
(I) Pugnacity transformed to creative impulse.
Pugnacity, like the other instincts, is modified a great
deal by the critical judgments and the educational programs of
society. However, it is not changed enough to meet the require-
ments of Christianity: "Resist not evil"; "Love your enemy".
Will such a program of non-resistance ever satisfy pugnacity?
It seems to do away with justice itself, and yet Christianity
asserts that to return evil for evil is unjust, is a mechani-
cal response. The creative response is to refuse to do the ex-
pected thing, to resist got evil, but to appeal to the possible,
the ideal self of the opponent by treating him as his best self
should be treated. Non-resistance comes "with the force of a
new idea",106 This kind of response alone will satisfy pugnaci-
ty for it destroys evil by destroying the source, by reforming
the will of its opponent.
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It is difficult to make non-resistance appear different from
weakness. It must be used honestly and significantly. Sometimes,
Hocking thinks, the conditions must "be created under which the
opponent will listen to the language of non-resistance, especially
in the case of international disputes. This makes wars necessary!
This is a slender justification for war. The principle might
hold true in personal relationships where it is possible to ad-
minister discipline in a spirit of love, but with nations? Who
would believe in the "still small voice" of non-resistance after
the use of the tremendous resistance forces in operation in
modern warfare? And where IS Hocking disposing of his theory
that changes in character must come through changes in world-
view, transformations of the will, rfcther than through forced
modification of behavior? Neumann in his review of Human Nature
and its Remaking calls attention to the weakness in this argu-
ment, 107
It is true, as Hocking says, that the antagonisms and competi-
tions of life cannot be entirely done awcy with. Pugnacity still
has the task of opposing difficulties. But the antagonistic
attitudes must be subordinated to this creative attitude into
which Christianity has transformed the instinct of pugnacity,
(2) Ambition transformed to the passion for sould,
Christianity will not permit the usual ambitions of wealth,
prestige, etc. It substitutes a new one of service, "He who
would be great must be servant of all," The start of this trans-
formation is effected by the natural dialectic of the will. We
have already seen how the desire for selfish power becomes a
desire for power to benefit others. This in itself is the essence
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of service. Christianity's contribution is in adding a high
interpretation of the goal of this service, expressing it as
"the conferring of spiritual life". 108 Ambition thus becomes,
when transformed by Christianity, the "passion for souls"," to
quote Hocking's use of an old phrase. This is is the most char-
acteristic effect of Christianity on behavior. The passion for
souls is the ultimate transformation not only of ambition," but
of pugnacity, and the will to power which controls all the in-
stincts; for the will to power can be fully realized only when
others as well as itself are "saved".
Lest this passion for souls seem too far away froip the
practical side of religion, Hocking hastens to insist that the
souls of men must be approached through their social and physical
relationships. He commends the mission enterprises which include
medical, educational and other services with their religious
efforts, and condemns those religious institutions which do not.
2, Salvation: right valuing.
Christianity has required the transformation of the instincts
into the form of a desire to "save" others. And since it places
its greatest emphasis on love as an attitude and as a feeling,
rather than on any specific conduct which might grow out of it,
the one who is "saved" must acquire this attitude first of all.
Hocking has called salvation a m atter of "right valuing" ritfoer
1G9
than a matter primarily of right action. But it is much more
difficult to change one's value-attitudes than to change behavior.
How is this transformation possible?
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a, The human agency.
The Christian has a desire to save others and that should he
his task, hut it is a very presumptuous one. He who thinks him-
self able to save others is not likely to win many followers.
We need too much transformation ourselves to be able to trans-
form others. The human agent of salvation is insufficient, Chris -
tianity, however, does not allow the missionary zeal to cool so
quickly. It does not suppose that man alone can save his fellow
men, but it does say that man in "participation" with God can do
so. It is not presumptuous to attempt to save others when the
merit goes to something beyond ourselves. It is not even necessary
to wait until our own state of right valuing has been perfected
for that time never comes. We must know God and hence to some
extent become like Him, participate in His nature. If v/e can do
that we can save others through Him, But how can we know God?
No worship of any sort is sufficient to reveal God to us if
our own efforts are all that are involved. Does Christianity
have any way of helping us to know God?
b. The Divine aggression,
Christianity recognizes that the human being alone is able
to save neither himself nor others, Eherefore salvation must
ultimately come from without. The history of religions has shown
a leaning toward those which offer divine aid; psychology points
to a moral appetite which, like curiosity, is seeking new atti-
tudes, 110 Christianity depicts God as an "aggressive lover"
seeking where He may reveal Himself to men. His is an active
pursuing love; His is a will to power which is bent on saving
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others. With man seeking God and God seeking man it is possible
for man to find Him and know Him. And in knowing Him he has
found those true values which mark him a? saved, and enable him
to lead others to the same experience.
It is difficult to criticise beliefs with which one is in
fundamental agreement, as? we are in this whole section on reli-
gion. Hocking has given a clear, interesting and worthwhile
interpretation of the values of religion and its place in the
"remaking" of human nature. His discussion of worship and mysti-
cism, and his account of the transformation of the instincts
under the influence of Christianity are especially fine. His
definition of salvation as right valuing is a helpful contribu-
tion to the meaning of that much misunderstood term.
But there are some questions which arise and some criticisms
which need to be made of his treatment of religion. He speaks of
union with God as the good yet is not definite as to just what
he maans by union. Sometimes it is th^ climax of the extreme
mystical experience of which he speeks. But that is a good which
not everyone can attain, and he has said that whatever the good
may be it should at least be possible for every man to abhieve
it to some degree. He seems inconsistent here. Sometimes, however,
he speaks of union in terms of prophetic consciousness, approach-
ing the thought of cooperation with God in His purposes for the
world. The latter conception of union is not only nearer the
possible reach of men, but it is the better expression of the
good from the standpoint of the satisfaction of the will to
power. Union with God is an instrumental good since it produces
revelation, inspiration and prophetic consciousness. Is it also
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an intrinsic good? If so, how is it related to the value of
the realization of the will to power?
Any discussion of mysticism will arouse criticism from one
angle or another, for it is a field In which it is very difficult
to be sure of facts. It is not our* place to criticize Hocking's
views on mysticism except in their relation to ethics. In this
connection Macintosh 111 has claimed that Hocking overestimates
the values of mysticism, and underestimates the practical side
of religion. Hocking states the necessity of a recourse to wor-
ship after great activity, "but does not emphasize sufficiently
the necessity of working after worship. In other words Macintosh
is saying that Hocking has found values in religion (and has
exaggerated them), but has not related then adequately to the
work of the will to power in the world. But the criticism
seems poorly founded. Hooking lays his emphasis on worship just
because it provides man with the truth, the incentive, and the
assurance necessary for his "practical" religion. He has shown
that without worship man cannot work, and has also insisted
that religion is useless unless it does stimulate work and creati-
vity in man.
Another criticism has been made by Moore 112 in his review
of Human Nature and its Remaking , Hocking claims that religion
provides a direct and adequate realization of the will to power.
If so, then why retain the inadequate forms of realization? For
example, it is possible to follow Hocking's theory thus: man's
will to power finds satisfaction and realization in society and
the state, the latter existing we remember, primarily for the
purpose of establishing the objective conditions for the will.
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The guiding principle in its development is the whole-idea of
the individual. But the truest conception of the whole i6 the
God-idea which religion offers. Therefore in religion mankinds
the truest and perfect realization of Ms will to power. The
conclusion is likely to be drawn, if one is to be logical,
that the less complete conditions for the realization of the
will to power are no longer necessary. In other words Hocking
has not sufficiently related his various satisfactions of man's
central infctinct, or else we have failed to read him aright.
Is not the answer just this? Hocking implies it but does not
perhaps clarify it enough. Society and the state provide the
objective conditions for the will to power, the kind of world
in which it 8an develop; religion provides the best subjective
conditions for its realization, the truest idea of reality,
and hence the highest value-level and an effective stimulus
for growth. Both are necessary as Hocking insists several
times, 115

7*
CONCLUSION:
As was stated in the Introduction, Hocking's ethical theory is signifi-
cant because of the wide range of the study on which it is based, and its
consequent range of application* Although his greatest "book and his greatest
contribution are in the philosophy of religion, nevertheless he has done
valuable work in the philosophy of the state and has contributed some to
psychology and other sciences* A}} these linos of thought have left their
stamp on his ethical theory* It is more coherent because of them*
Hocking's contribution to ethics is not primarily in the goal which he
sets for life* The realization of the will to power, or self-development,
as he calls it in the Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Rights ,
is practically the same as the self-realization of many other ethical wri-
ters* It is in his interpretation of the desired satisfaction of the will
to power that we are interested* It is notable that he has put satisfaction
not primarily in the realm of the instincts and impulses of man, not efcen
primarily in the realm of feeling and emotion, but in the realm of the will
and the intellect* The will's function is to control, and organize the in-
stincts of man, making them promote a unified purpose* The intellect's
function is to guide the formation and development of that purpose • Through
knowledge it determines the best means of stisfying man's desire for "power"
taking into consideration the social life that is involved* Hocking puts
a maximum responsibility on man's ability to mold his own character* He is
not mechanized or predetermined by his inherited nature, his subconscious
self or his environment, at least only to a small extent* He has the power
of choice, of self-control even to the extent of transforming the most per-
sistent tnstir.cts; and to a considerable degBee he haa the power of molding
his environment instead of being molded by it*
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Another very important jii^se of Hocking* s teaching is his emphasis on
a synoptic view of value* Godd and evil must he judged not by looking at
each experience of life separately hut by looking at the whole. This pre-
vents an over-emphasis or an under—eraphasi s on any set of values* Although
we doubt that every man has as conscious and formulated a viiole-idea as Hock-
ing seems to suggest, yet the ideal which he has set is the ably one able to
produce a coherent system of values rightly related to each other and to
the ultimate goal of life* His standard for finding the true values has
not shown partiality to any one phase of life but can be used by all* We
only wish that
(
along with his theory of the vhole-idea as determinant of
value
)
he had made some classification of the values as they appear to him*
But he has not yet written an ethics book per se *
A third contribution which we see in Hocking's work is his attempt to
define the tasks and values of the various agencies which affect man's devel-
opment* He has dealt only with the major ones of course - society, the
state and religion - but has sought the principles which underlie each of
those, their justification for existence, their necessity, and finally the
ideals which they should strive to attain if they are to fulfil their pur-
pose in relation to the development of the powers in man* As has been said
earlier in the thesis, he has to a considerable extent been able to combine
a careful, scientific analysis of these institutions with a very idealistic
view of their possible values* It is a difficult thing to do. and at times
he is too idealistic and fails to make clear the relation between his des-
criptive and his normative discussions, but every such attempt is of value
to the field of ethics which must be built upon thorough understanding of
the facts of life* He has applied his own theory of the whole-idea to his
work* He has tfcied in so far as possible to relate the various aspects of
life to each other* This is seen even in his books which deal with parti-
cular problems rather than general*
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Finally, we "believe that HocMug's ethical theory is significant because
it is more than a theory* It aids in the understanding of those factors
which make the attainment of true value possible in actual living* It claims*
for example, and lays a firm basis for its claim, that man can know Reality,
can know God, and therefore he has an opportunity to discover truth from
falsehood in the realm of value • .Hocking finds that in religion, and especial-
ly in Christianity, man's whole-idea becomes increasingly perfected; and
more than that, his will is given the incentive which makes possible the
necessary transformations of character, and the desirable creativity of effort*
We do not say that Hocking has given the only true ethical theory* Far
from it, for we cannot even claim ability to judge this theory in relation
to other theories* But we do say that these things in Hocking's ethics are
significant: he has placed self-development in the realm of the will and
the intellect, and thereby has attributed great freedom to man in the control
of self and the formulation of character; he has emphasized the necessity
of a coherent system, or a synoptic view of values; he has made an impor-
tant contribution in the study of the function and purposes of various im-
portant agencies which affect man's development; and finally he has revealed
the possibility of the attainment of the ideals which he has set for man, at
least he has pointed out wherein that possibility may be found* These are
sufficiently important, it seems to us, to attract the attention of any
careful student of ethics and make worth while his study of their principles
and implications*
."£.-0
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Summary*
We may summarize the results of our study of Hocking^ ethioal theory
as follows:
Human nature inherits a group of instincts* These have no such highly
specialized stimulus-response mechanisms as those of levrer animals and
hence are better able to be modified and controlled* Experience, by means
of its pleasure and pain impressions, builds up a policy in the self -which
guides the activity of the instincts* This ruling policy is the will* It
gradually subordinates the instincts to itself and relates them in such a
way that they promote its policy*
The will lixich is fundamental in human nature is inadequately but best
expressed as the will to power* Experiences which satisfy this will to
power, leaving a sensation or general feeling of pleasure, or a favorable
mental-after-image, are sought for, repeated and tend to become habits*
Those which do not satisfy the will to power are avoided* Thus the self
develops a character*
The natural dialectic of the will tends to the interpretation of power
as non-competitive and service-ful rather than as selfish, for this ensures
its fullest realization, and the more permanent affect of its work* Soc-
iety and especially religion aid in this higher interpretation of the will
to power* Conscience is the awareness of inconsistency between the expres-
sion or activity of specific instincts and the ruling policy of the self in
its ultimate meaning* Social tradition and custom help its development,
but obligation is primarily an individual experience* It is one of the
chief agencies in guiding the transformations of the instincts*
Value lies in the satisfaction of the whole self and not of any partial
expressions of the self* Therefore the will to power is justified in its
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subordination of some instincts in favor of others. True freedom comes
with unity of purpose, not with undisciplined assertion of desire. How-
ever, discipline must take the form of sublimation rather than repression.
Values are determined by one's whole-idea, one 's world view or concep-
tion of reality. This is present from the beginning of consciousness but
experience constantly changes and enlarges it. The nearer one's whole-idea
approaches reality, the higher will be one's level of values, for reality
is essentially good. The vfcole-idea, under the influence of religion, be-
comes the God-idea. Sin is the deliberate refusal to act according to the
best interests of the will to power, or the refusal to take into account
the ultimate meaning of an act in the light of one's whole-idea or God-idea.
Sin is possible because of the dilemmas involved in almost every moral choice*
Man's fundamental right is to develop the powers that are in hi$. In
order to do this, he must be aided by society. The good society, that is,
the one which promotes the self-development of its members, must comply
with the following postulates: its will for the individual must be identical
with the individual's best interpreted will for himself; it must subordi-
nate its competitive interests; it must make provision for changing its
institutions when they have become useless or out of date; and it must
conserve its institutions in proportion to its certainty of their value.
These are high ideals for society. Something more definitely organized
than society in general is necessary for their realization. This organi-
zation is the state.
The necessity of the state is based psychologically on the will-circuits
of its members, ffill-circuits are the overflow of the wills to power, the
extensions of selves in the form of interlocking activities, mutual depend-
ence on certain objects, sources of supply, etc. The state is the necessary
expression of these vital circuits. Every man wills the state whether he
79
combs
seems conscious of it or not, and the state has the right to the sovereign-
ty it claims not only because of its unique relation to the wills to power,
but because by its sovereignty it gives greater freedom of development to all
other subordinate groups*
The purpose of the state is to establish those objective conditions which
are necessary for the full realization of the will to power* These are: a
permanent order, assuring security and permanence to the creative efforts of
man; an available storehouse of acquired wisdom, cutting short the time
spent in learning by experience, and helping man to learn the best interpret-
ation of his will; and justice, toe elimination of unnecessary friction, the
securing of a condition in which fair dealing can be the rule and not the
exception*
These also are high ideals* The state needs the help of religion in
attaining them, for religion promotes the attitudes and interests which make
possible the conditions named above* The state and the church should remain
separate but each should be free to criticize and supplement the work of the
other*
Art and religion both minister to phases of the will to power which are
left unsatisfied by society and the state* Art can do this only partially*
fleligion does it completely* It interprets reality as divine and by this
God-»idea offers man the opportunity to know true values from false, the best
from the good* Through worship man receives some revelation of truth; a
creative attitude toward life, or inspiration; and prophetic consciousness,
the knowledge of his worth in the world and the ability to place his work
in its history* Worship or mysticism leads to what religion claims as the
greatest value: union with God; but this union never can be complete*
Worship must alternate with work* Evil is transmuted through association
with God* It is never pure evil*
.1 itj
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Christianity's chief contribution to morals is its emphasis on feelings
and attitudes which are determiners of action rather than on the modes of
behavior themselves. It places greatest value on love. This involves a
complete transformation of the instincts. The will to power with this new
interpretation is able to transform such instincts as pugnacity and ambition
into unselfish creative impulses, and ultimately to its own form of a
passion for saving the souls of men*
Salvation is an acquiring of this same attitude of love; hence it is a
condition of right valuing. It seems presumptuous however for men to claim
to save others. In fact they are unable to save themselves by their own
efforts, for to be saved, or to value rightly, is to know God, and only the
"pure in heart" know God. Christianity meets this difficulty by assuring
men that God is seeking to reveal Himself to men as eagerly as they are
seeking to know Him. It is this divine aggression which makes- the know-
ledge of God, and hence salvation also, possible* Knowledge of God enables
men to some extent to participate in His nature, and in participation with
Him, in recognizing dependence on Him, they can without undue presumption
share in His task of saving men. The final and highest transformation of
the will to power can be achieved and can find its satisfaction through
the Christian religion.
We have found the following things significant in Hocking's ethical
theory:he has placed self development in the realm of the will and the intel-
lect,and thereby has attributed great freedom to man in the control of self
and the formulation of character; he has emphasized the necessity of a co-
herent system, or a synoptic view of values; he has made an important con-
tribution in the study of the function and purposes of various important
agencies which affect man's development; and finally ,he has revealed the
possibility of the attainment of the ideals which he has set for man, at
least he has pointed out wherein that possibility may be found.
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